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The Bohns subsequently executed a quitclaim deed conveying
legal title to June Lake and its surrounding land to the Bank in lieu of
foreclosure. The Bank then executed a corporate quitclaim deed
conveying title to the lake and certain tracts of bordering land to
Robert and Josephine Arnold, and expressly reserving access to and
use of June Lake for recreational purposes for the benefit of
specifically described real estate to the Bank and its successors,
grantees and assigns. Later in time, the Arnolds conveyed title to June
Lake and some adjoining tracts of land to the Roketas. The deed
expressly provided the conveyance was subject to the "rights of other
owners of land bordering on June Lake with respect to land lying
within June Lake and in respect to the water and use of the surface of
said lake."
The court believed it evident thatJune Lake was created to benefit
the land surrounding it. Thus, those tracts of land bordering the lake
derived open and visible benefits from the lake. The court held the
right to the recreational use of the lake is essential to the beneficial
enjoyment of the tracts that border it. Thus, the purchase of the
property is as much for the right to use the lake as for the land itself.
Accordingly, the court found the Roketas' property was subject to an
easement for the benefit of the Hoyer tract, and that beneficial right to
the use of the lake for recreational purposes passed with the
conveyance of that tract to Hoyer.
With regard to the use of easements, there is a principle of
concurrent use, rather than exclusive use. The owner of the servient
estate must not interfere with the use of the easement by the dominant
estate, and the owner of the dominant estate cannot materially alter
the easement to place a greater burden on the servient estate or
otherwise interfere with the use or enjoyment of the servient estate by
its owner. The use of an easement by both landowners must be
permitted in accordance with their individual interests. The Roketas
set up a catfish farm at one end of the lake. The court found no
evidence this use interfered with Hoyer's right to use the lake for
recreational purposes. Accordingly, the court determined it possible
to permit the parties to concurrently use the lake without hindering
their individual interests.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
MINNESOTA
Zaluckyj v. Rice Creek Watershed Dist., 639 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000) (affirming the district court's ruling that appellants failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies and failed to show that to do
so would be futile, thus appellants are not entitled to judicial relief).
Washington County Judicial Ditch No. 2 is a thirteen-mile public
drainage system that was originally established in 1909 pursuant to a
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court order. Land along the ditch is comprised of both private and
public interests. Appellants in this action are individuals who own
land along or near the ditch "Citizens"). Respondent Rice Creek
Watershed District is the drainage authority, respondents Department
of Natural Resources and the Board of Water and Soil Resources are
the state agencies that administer public water and wetlands
protection, and respondent Minnesota Center for Environmental
Advocacy, a nonprofit environmental group, intervened (collectively
"Respondents").
Citizens contended that overflowing water from the ditch flooded
their land. Thus, in 1995, the City of Hugo, which was a plaintiff in
the district court action, but did not file a notice of appeal, applied to
the watershed district for a permit to adjust the ditch by lowering three
culverts. This application was denied, but following a joint study and
other proceedings, the water shed district issued a permit in 1998
allowing one culvert to be lowered. In November of 1998, the City
petitioned the watershed district for a hearing pursuant to Minn. Stat.
§ 103E.075 (1998) to determine whether the other two culverts were
obstructing the flow of the ditch and thus should be lowered.
The watershed district denied the petition, determining that
lowering the culverts would not improve the hydraulic capacity of the
ditch unless other ditch repairs were made as well. The watershed
district noted that under Minn. Stat. § 103E.715 (1998), any interested
party may petition the watershed district to repair the ditch. However,
the City did not petition for repair; instead, the City and Citizens
landowners filed a declaratory judgment complaint and a petition for a
writ of mandamus in district court, seeking an order for the removal of
the obstructions and repair of the ditch, or, in the alternative, for
inverse condemnation proceedings and a determination that they were
exempt from certain rules and regulations. Before ever reaching the
merits of the case, the court determined that appellants failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to section 103E.715
and dismissed the action.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed two issues
using a clearly erroneous standard of review. First, the court asked
whether Citizens were entitled to ajury trial on the issue of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Citizens argued that in mandamus and
declaratory judgment proceedings, parties are entitled to have issues
of fact tried by a jury, and since the issue of exhaustion of remedies
involved disputed questions of fact, Citizens were entitled to a jury
trial. The court disagreed, however, and held that issues of exhaustion
and futility of administrative remedies are generally legal questions for
the court. Thus the district court did not err in ruling that Citizens
were not entitled to ajury trial regarding exhaustion of remedies.
Next, the court considered whether Citizens failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies or failed to show that exhaustion would have
been futile. Citizens contended that the administrative remedies for
ditch repair were not available to them as a matter of law and that it
would have been futile for them to try. In particular, Citizens rely on
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Minn. Stat. § 103E.715(4) (a) for the proposition that repairs should
not be made if the cost of repair exceeds the total benefits the
landowners received. Citizens estimated present day repair costs at
$400,000 to $500,000, which greatly exceeds the 1909 determination
that the benefits to the landowners were $34,053.
Citizens
acknowledge that if the benefits were redetermined to reflect modern
day values, the repairs would probably be a feasible remedy. The court
determined, however, that Citizens were erroneous in their reliance on
§ 103E.715(4) (a) because the cap on the price of the repair project
only applies when 26 percent of the landowners affected sign a
petition for repairs.
An alternative provision authorizes repair
regardless of cost when the drainage authority determines that the
repairs are necessary for the best interests of the affected property
owners, thus the remedy is available to Citizens.
Citizens further contend that it would be futile for them to petition
for repair of the ditch because respondents will not issue the necessary
wetlands replacement and public water permits. However, the court
disagreed, noting that respondents have not made a final decision on
the matter. Additionally, Citizens sought a determination that the
ditch repair was exempt from certain wetlands replacement
requirements and public water mitigation costs, and sought
determination of the applicability of various other water management
related rules. Citizens argued that the district court erred in declining
to address the issue, but the court ruled that issues of this type should
be determined through the administrative process of a petition for
repair. Thus Citizens failed to exhaust their administrative remedies,
or show that doing so would be futile.
Makayla A. Shannon
MISSOURI
In re Application of Osage Water Co., 51 S.W.3d 58 (Mo. App. 2001)
(holding because the city failed to give notice to Osage Water
Company of its petition forjudicial review of Public Service
Commission's decision to permit water company to provide water to
subdivision, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the cause).
This appeal arose out of a dispute over Osage Water Company
("Water Company") supplying water to the Parkview Bay Subdivision
("Parkview") in the city of Osage Beach, Missouri ("Osage"). Osage
had earlier approved a plan allowing the Water Company to supply
water to Parkview providing that the Water Company met certain
design standards set forth in the Code of Ordinances. A few months
later, Osage withdrew its approval stating that the water company had
failed to meet the design standards for the water franchise ordinance.
In response, the water company filed an application for a
"certificate of public convenience and necessity" with the Public

